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ABSTRACT: The sponsorship of pilgrimage to Mecca by European colonial powers in the 19th and 20th centuries 
contributed to transforming the hajj into the global phenomenon it is today. Spain also promoted Muslim pilgrimage 
from its zone of the Moroccan Protectorate, tentatively at first, and then more purposefully from 1937 onwards, con-
tinuing its sponsorship into the early 1970s, years after Morocco’s independence. Intensive study of administrative 
documentation from the Spanish Protectorate allows the reformulation of the sponsorship’s established chronology 
(from 1937 to 1956). It also shows the dual intent concealed behind its promotion: first, as propaganda aimed at the 
interior of the Moroccan territory being administered; and second, as a tool for the external promotion of a political 
regime in need of support to escape its international isolation. The pilgrimage’s sponsorship is seen as part of the 
general framework of managing Muslim rituals enacted by the Spanish government to deactivate their potential mo-
bilising capacity.
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RESUMEN: El camino a La Meca. El patrocinio del peregrinaje musulmán por parte del Estado español (1925-
1972).- El patrocinio de la peregrinación a La Meca por parte de las potencias coloniales europeas en los siglos XIX 
y XX contribuyó a transformar el hajj en el fenómeno global que es hoy. España también promovió la peregrinación 
musulmana desde su zona del Protectorado marroquí, tentativamente al principio, y luego con más determinación a 
partir de 1937 en adelante, continuando su patrocinio a principios de la década de 1970, años después de la indepen-
dencia de Marruecos. El estudio intensivo de la documentación administrativa del protectorado español permite la 
reformulación de la cronología establecida del patrocinio (de 1937 a 1956). También muestra la doble intención 
oculta detrás de su promoción: primero, como propaganda dirigida al interior del territorio marroquí que se adminis-
tra y, segundo, como una herramienta para la promoción externa de un régimen político que necesita apoyo para es-
capar de su aislamiento internacional. El patrocinio de la peregrinación se ve como parte del marco general de ges-
tión de los rituales musulmanes promulgados por el gobierno español para desactivar su potencial capacidad de 
movilización.
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INTRODUCTION
The attempt to mould a bespoke Islam, envisioning a 
stable, compact order in which Muslim populations were 
slotted within reference frameworks that singled them 
out, kept them in an identity compatible with Western 
values, and neutralised their potential reactivity, has dif-
ferent readings in colonial times and today. Both read-
ings, however, focus their efforts on galvanising the fig-
ure of the “Muslim” as a social category onto which a 
series of assumptions are projected that serve to place 
these individuals within a set of ordered references. The 
essentialisation of this “Muslim-ness” becomes an ele-
ment that is considered both when defining Muslims’ le-
gal status in colonial times, and when incorporating this 
singularity into the structures of a liberal democracy that 
is more or less receptive to cultural and religious plurali-
ty, as it is conceived in modern-day Europe (Moreras, 
2017, pp. 13-37). The problem of this essentialisation is 
that it is often disrupted by other components being incor-
porated along with the notion of “Muslim”. These may be 
ethnic and based on the cultural affiliations that make up 
these groups’ identities, as with the category of “moro” 
(Moor) used commonly in the Spanish Protectorate in 
Morocco, they may be terms with evolutionary connota-
tions such as “indigenous”, or they may be political, as is 
the case for European Muslims and their assimilation 
within foreign populations, where they find their full ac-
cess to the citizenship of these countries limited. 
Taking the work done in previous studies as a starting 
point (Moreras-Tarrés, 2013; Moreras, 2018, pp. 237-
268), this text will use a specific example – Spanish state 
sponsorship of pilgrimage to Mecca during its colonial 
rule of northern Morocco – as a means of understanding 
the genealogy of how the category of Muslim is articulat-
ed for the purposes of political control. I have consulted 
the documentation of the Spanish administration in Africa 
in the Archivo General de la Administración (Alcalá de 
Henares), the Spanish National Library (Madrid) and the 
Library of Catalonia (Barcelona). First it must be recog-
nised that although the study of the Spanish colonial ad-
ministration in Morocco is well consolidated in the fields 
of history and the social sciences, studies focussing ex-
plicitly on analysing the political instrumentalization of 
Islam remain scarce. 
The administrative documentation I have used in this 
work is part of the varied and uneven corpus that consti-
tutes what Manuela Marín calls “colonial literature”, 
whose credibility as “source for the knowledge of the 
Spanish-Moroccan colonial relationship has not always 
been favourable” (Marin, 2015, p. 20). The propaganda 
component of this documentation – evident from the very 
promotion of the pilgrimage – distorts the description of 
the events, and the testimony of the Moroccan people is 
practically suppressed, with the exception of the grateful 
words of notable figures with privileged relationships 
with the colonial administration. But nevertheless, the 
documentation is essential to understanding the mecha-
nism of making colonial knowledge (Stoler, 2002) and the 
context of colonial cognitive production (Mateo Dieste 
and Villanova, 2013) in this period. A detailed analysis 
of this documentation allows us to understand the com-
plex articulation of a colonial model which, despite 
wanting to claim itself to be fraternal or disinterested ac-
cording to the official rhetoric (Moga, 2007), showed a 
high degree of improvisation and vagueness, “which 
caused the performance of the interventors (interven-
tores) to be guided, on numerous occasions, by personal 
judgment” (Villanova, 2005, p. 96). This text provides an 
example of the interest of the leading colonial ideologue 
Tomás García Figueras1 in convincing first the protector-
ate authorities and later the Spanish government to pro-
mote the pilgrimage to Mecca for the benefit of the Mus-
lims who lived in Spanish Morocco, as other colonial 
powers were doing.
We are indebted to authors such as Josep Lluís Mateo 
Dieste (2003) for the interest in analysing the role of Is-
lam in the development of the colonial administration 
during the protectorate. The official rhetoric proclaimed 
tacit respect for Moroccan religious and cultural singular-
ity (Jewish as well as Islamic) as a way of showing the 
“fraternity” on which the colonial action was based. But, 
essentially, the colonial administration sought to avoid Is-
lam becoming an active ingredient in the resistance to 
colonisation and opted for control of public expressions 
of Islamic religiosity – beginning with the figure of the 
Khalifa2 himself as commander of the faithful (amr al-
muminin) – which were concealed beneath the calculated 
image of Spain as protector of the Islamic religion. Patri-
cia Hertel (2015) demonstrates the progressive construc-
tion of Islam as the “colonial other” in which three ele-
ments mix: the historical past relating to Islam, in which 
references to the Arab presence and the later reconquista 
are permanent; the experiences resulting from the Span-
ish penetration into Morocco and the different wars re-
sulting from it; and the disturbance generated by the in-
corporation of differentialist historical prejudices 
synthesised around the concept of “moro”, a term whose 
use is constant, habitual and employed as an archetype of 
Spanish national identity. Finally, Eric Calderwood 
(2018) shows that the common effort by the Hispano-Mo-
roccan political and cultural elites in the 19th and 20th cen-
turies to insist on this collective past uniting Morocco and 
Spain ended up creating an Andalusian identity that, no 
matter which historical arguments were invoked, was not 
the product of a medieval past, but of an unequal meeting 
between the two societies (a narrative that continues to be 
exploited in recent times, in this case with a dual touristic 
and cultural purpose). Calderwood suggests that appeal-
ing to this common past served to explain uncomfortable 
alliances that were established mutually both in order to 
uphold the colonial administration and for Moroccan 
power elites to prolong their privileged status with an 
eye, probably, on a future in which they could embrace 
nationalist perspectives that would allow them to shake 
off the colonial yoke. 
The sections that follow seek to analyse the sponsor-
ship of the hajj. They reveal a new chronology that cor-
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rects the 1937-1956 one established by other authors 
(Solà, 2001, pp. 56-61; Mateo Dieste, 2003, pp. 259-263), 
extending it back to 1925, the time of the first document-
ed reports of the colonial administration proposing the 
need to organise the pilgrimage, and forwards to 1972, 
when a group of prominent figures from Western Sahara 
had the privilege of being the last to travel to Mecca 
thanks to the Spanish state. 
The administrative documentation on this pilgrimage 
may be consulted in the Archivo General de la Adminis-
tración (AGA). It is distributed irregularly across the col-
lection on the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco. The ma-
terial on the 1925 to 1931 period is in Box 81/665, AFR, 
AGA. Legajo: Peregrinaciones. Due to the number of 
documents containing annotations that seem to match the 
handwriting of Tomás García Figueras, it may be sup-
posed that he compiled all this documentation in order to 
prepare his proposal for promoting pilgrimage (which 
will be analysed below), as it would otherwise have end-
ed up dispersed. As well as the AGA, the documentation 
on sponsorship from 1937 to 1972 was consulted at the 
Biblioteca Nacional de España (Fondo África) and the 
Biblioteca de Cataluña.
PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA IN THE COLONIAL 
CONTEXT (19TH-20TH CENTURIES)
Various academic publications show the growing in-
terest in studying the sponsorship of pilgrimage to Mecca 
by the European colonial powers (Chantre, 2012, 2018; 
Chiffoleau, 2015; Kane, 2015; Slight, 2015; Ryad, 2017). 
The modernization of means of transport contributed not 
only to improving travelling conditions, which had previ-
ously taken place over land, but opened the door to mak-
ing the hajj the global phenomenon we know today. Ac-
cording to Chantre (2012, pp. 89-229), the different 
colonial powers became active promoters of it, develop-
ing genuine “pilgrimage to Mecca policies” in which dif-
ferent interests converged – commercial, geostrategic and 
protective, both from the transmission of diseases and 
from political ideas that might destabilise their colonial 
dominions. All this patronage was clearly masked by in-
tense propagandistic promotion in which the European 
states sought to appear as defenders of Islam. 
France was the first country to establish this control of 
pilgrims leaving its colonial dominions based on health 
concerns, which also subsequently served to prevent the 
penetration of nationalist propaganda imported from the 
Middle East. A dahir (decree) on March 14th 1929 and a 
vizierial decree on March 15th 1929 established the condi-
tions of pilgrimage from the French Moroccan area, with 
departure exclusively from Casablanca. It seemed clear 
that prominent Moroccans in the Spanish zone would 
take interest in the pilgrimage being organised from 
French Morocco or Algeria. The written press of the time 
gathered varied information on the subject (even before 
the 1929 decree): “Journey to Mecca. Authorization has 
been granted to Driss el Rifi and al Kaid of Salaui proper-
ties to make the pilgrimage to Mecca” (La Libertad, May 
17th 1924); “H.E. Abd-el-Kader and numerous notable 
Moors depart for Mecca” (El Telegrama del Rif, March 
11th 1930). In April 1929 the Spanish Intervención Gen-
eral ordered the various regional interventors3 to inform 
them of the number of pilgrims requesting authorization 
to carry out the hajj, a figure that turns out to be very 
modest.4
The Spanish colonial administration in Morocco 
seemed to play a secondary role in this context. A memo 
sent by the chair of the Council of Ministers to the Span-
ish High Commission in Morocco on May 12th 1930, 
which included a reference to the Spanish consul in Tunis 
resolving the problems of Moroccan pilgrims in the Span-
ish zone starting their journeys to Mecca, changed this 
situation. For the first time it was proposed that “it would 
be convenient for this High Commissioner’s office to re-
ceive information on the pilgrimage to Mecca this com-
ing year, on how to carry out the organization of this 
trip”.
In the original document this paragraph is underlined 
in red pencil, and alongside it appears a handwritten note: 
“our pilgrims to Mecca have embarked in Tunis thanks to 
the consul’s arrangements, but henceforce journeys 
should be organized in our zone”. This note was written 
by Tomás García Figueras, a key figure in the develop-
ment of the colonial administration, who at that time was 
the head of the Spanish-French Mixed Office in Tangier.5 
He was the first to promote the proposal that the Spanish 
should sponsor the pilgrimage.
A NEGLECTED PROPOSAL (1925-1931)
The AGA documentation contains two documents, 
dated December 16th and 18th 1925, that include handwrit-
ten annotations by Tomás García Figueras. The first of 
these, entitled “Pilgrimage to Mecca sponsored by the 
government in a Spanish boat, leaving from Ceuta and 
Melilla”6 is four pages long and analyses the pilgrimage 
from a political and commercial point of view. It begins 
by arguing that the peaceful use of this ritual’s promotion 
would be more effective than any military campaign, an 
implicit reference to the events around the Rif rebellion 
years earlier. Promoting the pilgrimage was therefore 
seen as an act of propaganda in which the testimony of 
the pilgrims would be used: “Spain sends people in order 
to show its value, and that in Morocco it enacts a genuine 
protectorate ” (p. 2). The second document (signed by the 
Oficina Central de Intervención of Tétouan on December 
18th 1925) defines some of the ideas presented in the pre-
vious text in greater detail, insisting that the aim of the 
sponsorship emerges from “the most absolute respect for 
religion [...]; which for our regime is one of affection and 
tenderness towards protégés” (p. 1). He also proposes this 
initiative as a way to improve the international image of 
the Spanish Protectorate and “demonstrate to the Muslim 
world that Spain is going to war merely to fight a few re-
bels” (p. 2).
The chair of the Spanish Council of Ministers dis-
missed the proposal on February 1st 1926, arguing that 
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carrying out this project was not recommendable given 
“the current state of turmoil that exists in almost all Is-
lamic countries” and the risk of “putting the Muslims in 
our Moroccan zone in contact with their co-religionists in 
the east” (p. 1). 
After the government’s refusal, the question of pil-
grimage to Mecca was put on hold for a few years. It was 
not until May 1930 that Tomás García Figueras again 
raised the need to organize the trip from the Spanish Pro-
tectorate. To do this, he retrieved the note that was sent on 
March 29th 1930 by the Spanish consul in Tunisia, in 
which he reported the difficulties faced by Moroccan pil-
grims setting out from the country and recommended in 
future years organising the pilgrimage from the territory 
of the protectorate. In the memo sent by the Oficina Cen-
tral de Intervención in Tétouan on May 12th 1930, it is ar-
gued that there is a need to “find out about the pilgrimage 
to Mecca next year, and how to organize the trip”.7
Thus, the following month, the translation and inter-
pretation service at the Oficina Central de Intervención in 
Melilla translated the pilgrimage regulation in force in 
Tunisia into Spanish and reports were requested from re-
gional interventor’s offices about the true demand of po-
tential pilgrims, with scant results.
Again, it was a memo issued by a consular representa-
tive in Alexandria that insisted on the need to be involved 
in preparations for the pilgrimage. This memo was sent 
from the chair of the Spanish Council of Ministers at the 
General Directorate of Morocco on July 10th 1930 and 
commented on the dispatch issued by the consul in Alex-
andria on May 22nd informing of the arrangements made 
to cover the travel expenses of two Moroccan pilgrims 
originally from Targuist and Senhaya travelling from Al-
exandria to Jeddah who had made the journey on foot 
from Morocco (after receiving a passport issued by the 
military interventor in November 1929) and who, finding 
themselves without resources, lived off Muslim charity. 
The consular missive indicates that because they lacked 
the economic means to guarantee their return journey, 
these pilgrims would be rejected by the Egyptian authori-
ties due to the application of the 1926 International Con-
vention of Paris, which led the consular delegate to resort 
to its legation’s extraordinary economic fund to ensure 
that these pilgrims had not make this long journey in vain. 
This highlights the lax control applied to individual mo-
bility. The consul himself argued that this situation would 
not be repeated but suggested the authorities should “for-
get or ignore the restrictions on the pilgrimage to Mo-
hammed’s Shrine envisaged in the International Conven-
tion of Paris of 1926, to which Spain has signed up”.8 
García Figueras took advantage of these circumstances 
to continue preparing documents to promote the pilgrim-
age, which were sent in September to Colonel Fernando 
Capaz, Inspector of Intervention and Khalifian Forces in 
Tétouan. The note attached to this documentation includes 
the following statement signed by García Figueras: “when 
the High Commissioner returns, I want to write to him to 
describe the willingness of the French to organise the pil-
grimage to Mecca by common agreement with the Span-
ish zone”.9 It is the first time in this documentation that the 
possibility of organising the pilgrimage jointly with the 
French colonial administration is raised. 
In the following months, different messages were sent 
between the regional interventors relating to the issue of 
pilgrimage, but it was in the first days of February 1931 
that Tomás García Figueras sent a report to Colonel Ca-
paz “in a personal and confidential capacity” (and 
stamped “secret”),10 which is a copy of the documentation 
sent to General Jordana, the High Commissioner in Mo-
rocco. The note insists on the need to adopt provisions on 
the issue of pilgrimage, and wonders whether it would be 
convenient to reach an agreement with the French Protec-
torate “so any indigenous person from our zone may join 
the expedition organized from Casablanca if they so de-
sire” (p. 2). The memo is accompanied by a letter 
(stamped “private”), addressed to General Jordana, that 
insists that there are security reasons for supervising the 
pilgrimage – to “protect these fanatical populations from 
the influence of the Hejaz, where King Saud is establish-
ing himself in the name of pure religion as a symbol of an 
Islamic nation that could strengthen the nationalist cam-
paign” (p. 1).11 Organizing a trip that avoided entering 
Egypt, and in which a commissioner would participate, as 
well as facilitating the embarkation of “governmental in-
digenous people”, would contribute to “neutralizing cer-
tain influences”. A separate undated document makes a 
kind of summary of all procedures and information ex-
changes relating to the issue of pilgrimage (and again 
contains a handwritten title in García Figueras’s hand). Its 
final paragraph mentions a handwritten note from Colo-
nel Capaz, attached to the documentation mentioning 
García Figueras’s proposal, which is important for under-
standing its purpose: “I submit some notes from this file 
to H.E., which I hope will return resolved by the General 
Delegation at some point”. In fact, the response never ar-
rived, and everything suggests that García Figueras’s pro-
posal was rejected again. Perhaps – along with his grow-
ing disagreement with the policies implemented by the 
Second Republic12– this was what motivated Tomás 
García Figueras to resign from the leadership of the 
Mixed Office and return to Jerez de la Frontera, at least 
until 1936, when he came back to Morocco at the express 
invitation of General Franco.
THE BEGINNING OF SPONSORSHIP (1937-1947): 
FRATERNITY AGAINST “FAITHLESS MEN”
Spanish Civil War historiography considers the upris-
ing of the army based in Morocco to be fundamental to 
the initial success of the military coup. Winning the loy-
alty of the protectorate’s population was crucial not only 
in order to enlist troops, but also to avoid potential rear-
guard conflicts. Hence, the High Commissioner imposed 
by the rebels, Colonel Juan Beigbeder, made political and 
symbolic gestures such as informing Khalifa Muley Has-
san in advance that the uprising was going happen and 
decreeing Eid al-Adha an official holiday to win the sup-
port of the Moroccan authorities. Beigbeder, an Africanist 
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officer with long experience in Morocco (like Franco and 
other rebel army officers), was well aware of the impor-
tance sponsoring pilgrimage to Mecca could acquire.13 
Knowing that France had been promoting it since the be-
ginning of the 20th century, he decided to reverse the pas-
sive position held by the previous Delegation of Indige-
nous Affairs on the issue (at no point is García Figueras’s 
earlier proposal mentioned)14 and suggested the provi-
sional government in Burgos should organize the pilgrim-
age from Ceuta. With the chartering of the motorboat 
Domine (renamed Magreb al-Aksa), which belonged to 
the shipping line Transmediterránea, the project got un-
derway. Beigbeder organised the trip in barely two 
months, skilfully using the contacts established with the 
Moroccan authorities that had joined the rebellion. The 
ship was due to leave Ceuta on January 21st 1937, but the 
day before departure it was bombarded by a Republican 
plane. Despite only material damage occurring, the rebel-
lious military authorities took advantage of this event to 
arouse feelings of hostility in the Muslim population to-
wards the government of the Spanish Republic (De Ma-
dariaga, 2015, p. 348).
Beigbeder’s project made no sense without an intense 
publicity and propaganda campaign, both to inform those 
potentially interested, and to develop a discourse to justi-
fy the promotion of pilgrimage. This propaganda cam-
paign used both the Spanish and Arabic written press, 
broadcast news and instructions over the radio, and dis-
tributed hundreds of propaganda leaflets and posters in-
viting Muslims from Ceuta and Melilla to take part in the 
pilgrimage (Solà, 2001, p. 58). The propaganda was man-
aged from the regional interventor’s offices and cabilas, 
and qadis took charge of drawing up the lists of all the 
people interested in the pilgrimage that year. The inter-
ventors compiled the lists from the different cabilas, 
which were then sent to the Delegation of Indigenous Af-
fairs for approval. In the case of soldiers from the regular 
indigenous forces, the imams from each group took re-
sponsibility for drawing up the lists, which were also sent 
to the interventors in order to apply for the appropriate 
permits. 
The propagandistic purposes of organising the pil-
grimage are evident from the elements repeated in subse-
quent editions, though with different intensity. First, colo-
nial authorities insisted on presenting this sponsorship as 
a joint action between the High Commissioner of Moroc-
co and the Makhzen. Hence, an official travel committee 
was established. A political leader (attached to the colo-
nial administration) and a religious one (designated by 
the Makhzen) were supported by other specific officials 
(qadi, adul, imam and others), who were in charge of re-
solving situations that arose during the trip (disputes, 
drawing up wills and final wishes, death certificates, mar-
riages, etc.). Secondly, importance was given to narrating 
the event, broadcasting news about the progress of the 
journey, and even producing an account of it, as the High 
Commissioner asked the Tetouani faqih Ahmad bin Mu-
hammad al-Rahuni to do for the 1937 pilgrimage (cf. Cal-
derwood, 2018, pp. 142-166).15 Another notable fact was 
that on the first trip the presence was reported of the “first 
Muslim consul to represent Spain abroad” (El faro de 
Ceuta, January 24th 1937): this was Mohamed Kaddur 
ben Amar, a close collaborator with the Delegation of In-
digenous Affairs, who was named consul in Jeddah. 
The pilgrims registered and selected were given re-
ceipts that were exchanged for return travel tickets on the 
actual day of the journey. The interventors also facilitated 
currency exchange (from dirhams to pounds sterling) us-
ing the official established rates for expenses incurred in 
the holy places. As with the French authorities, health is-
sues were also a constant concern when organising the 
hajj. The length of the journey meant various incidents 
were predicted, and frequent epidemics (plague, cholera, 
etc.) in the countries where the boats landed meant a care 
system for the pilgrims had to be set up. The journey’s of-
ficial committee included a health team formed of Mus-
lim doctors and carers who accompanied the pilgrims 
during their stay in Mecca. Feeding the pilgrims was an-
other of the concerns when organising the hajj, not only 
because of the number of people who had to be catered 
for, but also because food needed to be halal. The kitchen 
was staffed by Muslim cooks, and slaughterers travelled 
who sacrificed the livestock on board to feed the pilgrims, 
in addition to celebrating the feast of sacrifice.16
The culmination of this first trip is particularly signifi-
cant: upon the pilgrims’ return, a visit was planned to Se-
ville and other Andalusian cities, where other prominent 
Muslims arriving from the protectorate joined them. 
Franco received the pilgrims in Seville’s Alcázar. Years 
later, García Figueras recounted the story using one of his 
pseudonyms, Vial de Morla,17 quoting the words of Fran-
co himself: “at these new moments in the world, when a 
danger arises for all, which is the danger of faithless men, 
that is when all men of faith unite to fight those without 
it” (Vial de Morla, 1947, pp. 76-77).
The intense official propaganda could not deny the 
modest impact of the first trip. Mateo Dieste (2003, p. 
260) refers to some pilgrims’ criticisms about the care re-
ceived during the journey, as reflected in the secret re-
ports produced by the French administration in Morocco. 
The Delegation for Indigenous Affairs was aware that it 
was necessary to improve the promotion of the pilgrim-
age, so High Commissioner Beigbeder exploited the 
structure of regional interventors to ensure a higher num-
ber of enrolments for the hajj in subsequent years. Leaf-
lets and posters were produced to publicise the low costs 
of pilgrimage. The ship given the task of performing the 
second and third trips (1938 and 1939) was the Marqués 
de Comillas, which was larger and more comfortable than 
the Domine-Magreb al-Aksa. 
In 1939, with the civil war recently finished, organis-
ing the pilgrimage took on an even more epic tone, in 
which the Spanish government’s great effort was empha-
sised: their battered post-war economy would not prevent 
them from sponsoring the pilgrimage and covering “those 
deprived of fortune, those who shared in these benefits, 
giving some of them completely free passage, including 
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travel expenses in the land of Mecca” (ABC, April 4th 
1939). 
Finally, both the pilgrims’ farewells and greetings be-
came public commemorations that were skilfully organ-
ised by the protectorate authorities. Pilgrims were waved 
off in Plaza de España in Tétouan (capital of the Spanish 
Protectorate) by the Makhzen and protectorate authorities 
with a military parade, musical bands from the religious 
brotherhoods, amid flags and banners, and with a crowd 
that was ready to join in with the party atmosphere. Those 
who started the journey stopped to pray at the Sidi Saidi 
mosque, from where they headed to Ceuta to board the 
ship (ABC, September 27th 1949). 
THE SPONSORSHIP IS CONSOLIDATED  
(1949-1953): INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION
In spite of the High Commission’s preparations for 
the 1940 pilgrimage,18 the trip had to be suspended due to 
the Second World War and the economic slowdown Spain 
suffered when its post-war period began. In 1946 an at-
tempt was made to resume the organisation of the pil-
grimage without success, and in 1947 the trip was sus-
pended again due to the cholera epidemic declared in 
Egypt. None of this stopped the protectorate administra-
tion continuing its habitual practice of promoting other 
Muslim religious celebrations such as Eid al-Adha, when 
it distributed lambs and cash donations to Muslims in 
need (El faro de Ceuta, December 8th 1943).
At the end of the 1940s, Spain found itself interna-
tionally isolated due to its collaboration with the Germans 
and Italians in the Second World War. In 1946 the United 
Nations General Assembly vetoed Spain’s membership, 
with the Arab League abstaining from the vote. This iso-
lation led the Franco regime to direct its diplomatic ef-
forts towards Latin American and the Arab countries (Al-
gora Weber, 1995; González, 2007). Again, the pilgrimage 
acquired a raison d’être, both for developing diplomatic 
relations and for seeking to highlight differences from 
other models of colonial administration.
In 1949 the pilgrimage to Mecca was resumed in a 
spectacular way: the journey would be made in a 32-seat-
er aeroplane to Saudi Arabia. The pilgrims left Tétouan 
aerodrome, making a stop in Melilla to collect other 
prominent people invited by the Spanish government. 
The religious leader of the expedition was the delegate of 
the Grand Vizier of the eastern zone of the Protectorate, 
‘Abd al-Qãdir al-Hajj Tayyib, and as civil authority they 
were accompanied by the regional interventor, Valentín 
Benéitez Cantero, who produced a report entitled Peregr-
inación a La Meca. Memoria del viaje (Tétouan, Deleg-
ación de Asuntos Indígenas, October 1949) (cf. Mateo 
Dieste, 2017). 
The 1950s saw a new phase begin in the pilgrimage to 
Mecca, which coincided with the Franco regime’s con-
solidation, the execution of the first five-year economic 
development plans, and the adoption of a new role in the 
international sphere at the start of the Cold War.19 In terms 
of comparisons with the French colonial enterprise, the 
Spanish government chose to highlight its material action 
in Morocco, creating infrastructure and contributing to 
social order, in contrast with the territory administered by 
the French, where the tension around Moroccan inde-
pendence was beginning to emerge. Again, the figure of 
Lieutenant General García Valiño, High Commissioner in 
Morocco, was important in the renewed promotion of the 
idea of “Spanish-Moroccan fraternity”.  
In 1950, pilgrimage by sea was resumed from Tangier 
– although not part of the Spanish Protectorate, it was an 
international area. The ship used from that point was the 
transatlantic vessel Plus Ultra, which was renovated to 
improve the pilgrims’ comfort, adding a prayer room, 
spaces for ablutions and separation between women and 
men, as well as a clinic staffed by Muslim doctors. A total 
of 250 pilgrims participated in that year’s trip (from Au-
gust 18th to October 16th), among them 30 women. A sig-
nificant feature of this trip was that the boat carried a do-
nation of clothes for Arab refugees from Palestine, which 
was delivered to Port Said in Egypt (ABC, August 18th, 
1950). On the 1951 trip pilgrims from the Sahara were 
invited for the first time. 
The 1952 and 1953 trips were those that took most 
pilgrims: 500 on the first and 532 on the second, of whom 
120 were women.20 The press followed these journeys 
closely, reporting on their progress and any events; even 
NO-DO, one of the regime’s largest propaganda instru-
ments, dedicated graphic reports to it in 1951, 1952 and 
later on in 1966.21 
As was now habitual, both the departure and arrival of 
the pilgrims were singular opportunities for signalling the 
brotherhood between the Spanish and Moroccan authori-
ties. The speech welcoming the pilgrims made by High 
Commissioner García Valona on September 24th 1953 
represents the essence of this desire to convert pilgrimage 
sponsorship into a tool of dissemination at international 
level, of the respectful task of protecting Moroccan soci-
ety performed by the Spanish authorities: “you have also 
fulfilled the high purpose that I set for you of being a spir-
itual embassy for the Zone of Morocco protected by 
Spain to the Arab countries of the Middle East, for whom 
we feel real sympathy and whose problems interest us. 
When the serious news of what was happening in part of 
the Moroccan empire reached all corners of the world, a 
contrasting example also reached them which reflected 
the most complete and absolute peace in the zone pro-
tected by Spain” (África, no. 142, October 1953, p. 504).
This may have been one of the last events at which 
this “Spanish-Moroccan fraternity” was acted out. It had 
already begun to languish and dissolve – if it had ever had 
any solidity at all – in the face of the rise of the Moroccan 
nationalist movements that would achieve independence 
in 1956. The pilgrimage was not organized in 1954 and 
1955 and, paradoxically, in June 1956 the Moroccan au-
thorities organized the pilgrimage to Mecca by chartering 
the Cabo de Hornos ship from the Spanish shipping line 
Transmediterránea. The Spanish press published the 
preparations for the trip,22 reporting that the ship would 
depart from Casablanca and would carry “1,450 pilgrims 
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from various regions of Morocco. So there will be a great 
farewell. For its part, Israel has announced that it will not 
oppose the passage of Moroccan pilgrims to Mecca but 
will provide all kinds of facilities” (La Vanguardia, June 
14th 1957). The new Moroccan authorities reproduced 
Spain’s model of pilgrimage organization. Control of the 
symbolic capital of promoting the hajj was once again 
recognised by the newly independent Makhzen.
THE END OF SPONSORSHIP (1966-1972): THE 
COLONIAL APOGEE
We now enter a little-known phase of Spanish govern-
ment pilgrimage promotion: that carried out by the Fran-
co regime to take prominent figures to Mecca from the 
Spanish provinces of Ifni and the Sahara.23 A decade after 
Morocco’s independence, the Franco regime was resist-
ing the loss of its colonial dominions, despite them now 
being the last remnants of a finished colonial dream. In 
March 1966, the press reported the arrival of 40 pilgrims 
in Madrid to begin their journey to Mecca with Spanish 
government sponsorship. The front-page image of these 
pilgrims waiting in Palma de Mallorca airport to board a 
plane to Mecca in a national newspaper like ABC (March 
18th, 1966) was, by itself, a unique testimony to the re-
gime’s determination to continue promoting this trip. 
Both Ifni and the Sahara were territories claimed by 
Morocco after its independence. The new Alaouite state 
wrote to the United Nations to complain about Spain’s 
“illegal retention” of Ifni and Sahara. In 1966, reports by 
the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization 
urged Spain to decolonise these zones, despite giving a 
very positive evaluation of the “existing religious free-
dom, (…) the Spanish state’s aid for mosques and the an-
nual pilgrimage to Mecca” (ABC, August 18th 1966, p. 
25).24 In fact, the Spanish government, via the General 
Directorate of African Territories and Provinces, ap-
proved various extraordinary budgets dedicated to cover-
ing the expenses of the pilgrimage from Ifni (1966: 
362,145 pesetas; 1967: 827,302 pesetas) and the Sahara 
(1971: 6,000,000 pesetas; 1972: 7,807,646 pesetas). 25 
In this period a significant change of register occurred 
in relation to the treatment of these pilgrims: while in oth-
er eras “Muslim friends” and “indigenous people” were 
spoken of, from this point on the term “Spanish Muslims” 
began to be used – explicit recognition of their condition 
as nationals. The official media again echoed this recog-
nition, along with the resulting gratitude, and “their pride 
in feeling Spanish, members of Spanish society, a title 
they showed off on their pilgrimage and before the other 
nations of the world congregated in Mecca” (África, no. 
293, May 1966, p. 268).
The images produced by the regime again show the 
paternalistic image of grateful subjects before authorities 
unable to make old colonial laurels green again. The pic-
tures (shown by NO-DO),26 which show the pilgrims be-
ing received at the Palace of El Pardo in 1966 by the al-
ready elderly General Francisco Franco and the Minister 
of the Interior, Luís Carrero Blanco, are the staging of an 
already-finished project whose end the regime resisted 
accepting. The old rhetoric sounds hollow when, in Afri-
ca magazine of March 1972 (no. 363, “Excited reception 
for Muslim pilgrims”) it is said “they did it, and they will 
do it on further occasions, as Spain, friend of the Muslim 
peoples, respects their beliefs and supports their tradi-
tion”. 
CONCLUSIONS
This text has analysed the interest shown by the Span-
ish state in sponsoring the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, 
just as other colonial powers did. The documentation ana-
lysed has served to substantially modify the chronology 
of this interest and to show that, contrary to the estab-
lished historiography, it was not limited to the 1937-1956 
period, but ran from 1925 to 1972. This has allowed a se-
ries of stages to be established in which to contextualize 
the involvement of the Spanish government in this spon-
sorship. The organization of the pilgrimage began to take 
shape in a hesitant way. First proposed by Tomás García 
Figueras, the government of the Second Republic showed 
little interest and it was taken up again by the military 
authorities in the middle of the Spanish Civil War. It was 
consolidated during the 1940s and 1950s and, after the 
independence of Morocco in 1956, it moved to the terri-
tory of the Sahara, which remained under Spanish con-
trol, becoming a pale postcolonial glimmer of a regime 
determined to survive in a changing world.
The analysis of the documentation in the AGA shows 
more than the simple fact that this sponsorship was devel-
oped for propaganda purposes, or to obtain the support of 
the Moroccans in the protectorate after the military upris-
ing. There are other highly significant elements related to 
both the functioning of the colonial administration of Mo-
roccan territory and political use for international agen-
das.
The fact that from 1925 to 1931 Tomás García 
Figueras was personally involved in demonstrating to the 
Spanish government the advantages of promoting pil-
grimage from the Spanish Protectorate area was one more 
example of the prominent role personal initiative played 
in the colonial administration (Villanova, 2006). By stud-
ying the organization of the pilgrimage in Tunisia, and 
going so far as to suggest co-organizing it jointly with the 
French, García Figueras stated that it would substantially 
improve Spain’s international standing. It is evident that 
his proposal, in a context in which the pacification of the 
Moroccan territory was still very recent, did not receive 
the support of a Spanish government that was highly sen-
sitive to everything that happened in the protectorate. The 
advent of the Second Republic and the changes planned 
for the colonial-military complex in Morocco put an end 
to García Figueras’ plans and even led to his temporary 
abandonment of Morocco.
When in 1937 the High Commissioner, Colonel Juan 
Beigbeder, organized the first trip from Ceuta to Mecca, 
Tomás García Figueras could see how his idea could fi-
nally materialize. Destined to become one of the main co-
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lonial ideologues, he used the bombing of the ship by a 
Republican plane to influence the assumed “brotherhood 
among men of faith”, which would characterize the rheto-
ric of the rebel army during the Spanish Civil War: “Mus-
lim brothers, this affront cannot but strengthen even 
more, if possible, the bonds of brotherhood that unite us, 
and together we will fight to save civilization from the 
danger that threatens it” (quoted by De Madrigal, 2015, 
p. 348).
From that point on, promoting the pilgrimage was one 
of the many ways the colonial administration sought to 
demonstrate its fraternal disposition towards its Moroc-
can protégés. But these actions also sought to monitor the 
exercise of collective religious practice that, after the ap-
parent protection of the religious singularity and the insti-
tutions of Moroccan civil and religious authority, emulat-
ed the attitude of other competing colonial powers 
(Moreras, 2018). Spain’s major difference in this field 
was the past of Al-Andalus. All the “dreamy rhetoric” 
(Moga, 2007) deployed by colonial propaganda appealed 
to the secular link between Spain and Morocco. In fact, as 
Calderwood has pointed out (2018), it was used by Spain 
to model its own particular vision of what Islam would be 
in Morocco, which it understood as closely linked to the 
Andalusian past. There are numerous examples of the 
links between past and present being exploited, such as 
the reception General Franco offered to pilgrims on the 
first trip to Mecca in 1937 at the Alcázar in Seville.
But in addition to this double dimension of propagan-
da and ritual control, the promotion of pilgrimage also 
became an instrument with which to recover a certain 
prestige in the international context. The interest of the 
Franco regime in making pilgrimage a form of promoting 
Spain abroad is an undeniable fact, and formed part of the 
framework of fraternity with Arab countries that the Fran-
co regime chose as a way of breaking its international iso-
lation. Once colonial rule of northern Morocco ended, the 
Spanish government continued to endeavour to continue 
this “protective fraternity” with the territories of Ifni and 
Sahara. The apparent contradiction of a supposedly Cath-
olic military regime promoting a collective Islamic ritual 
ended up being positively acknowledged by the United 
Nations as a notable policy of recognising religious free-
dom in 1966. Doubtless, the propaganda drive to show 
the continuation of pilgrimage sponsorship after Moroc-
co’s independence contrasts with the real impact 
achieved, at a time when no other former colonial power 
had continued to carry out this practice. The purely testi-
monial nature of promoting the pilgrimage of a few nota-
ble Sahrawi’s, which the Spanish media portrayed as 
“Spanish Muslims” (see ABC March 18th 1966), and the 
footage produced by the regime’s propaganda, was not 
enough to preserve the colonial lustre of previous years.
In summary, the promotion of the pilgrimage to Mec-
ca by the Muslims of the Spanish Protectorate must be 
understood as more than just an “eccentricity” of General 
Franco and the Africanist military. It was a unique epi-
sode that, more than representing yet another example of 
colonial rhetoric, of a forced brotherhood motivated by 
the Civil War, showed the government’s desire to project 
itself in the international context, compete with other co-
lonial powers and improve its external image.
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NOTES
1 Tomás García Figueras (1892-1981) was one of the most sig-
nificant figures in the Spanish colonial administration. He was 
an interventor in the cabilas of Beni Aros and Sumata, a region-
al interventor in Larache, and head of the Spanish-French 
Mixed Office in Tangier. He was Secretary General of the High 
Commissioner and Delegate for Indigenous Affairs (1952-
1956). After the independence of Morocco, he was mayor of 
Jerez de la Frontera (1958-1965).
2 The Khalifa was the highest Moroccan authority in the Spanish 
Protectorate, and was delegated by the Sultan.
3 The interventores represented the cornerstone of the organiza-
tion of the Spanish Protectorate (Villanova, 2006), being the of-
ficials assigned to the field to supervise the various aspects of 
the colonial administration. In the words of the Africanist jurist 
and political scientist José María Cordero Torres, the interven-
tion consisted of “supervising the use of authority by indige-
nous hierarchies” (quoted by Villanova, 2005, p. 95) and ex-
tending the “indirect rule” model applied by the Spanish state. 
The interventores provided abundant information about Moroc-
can society, despite the fact that it was full of empirical errors, 
prejudices and simplifications (Mateo Dieste and Villanova, 
2013, p. 613).
4 According to the headquarters of each interventor’s office 
the numbers were: Melilla (77), Larache (15) and Villa San-
jurjo (33). In Tétouan and Chefchaouen no travelling permits 
were requested. Box 81/665, AFR, AGA. Legajo: Peregrina-
ciones. These pilgrimages occur within the framework of 
military control of the territory, which was not achieved un-
til 1927.
5 The Oficina Mixta de Información Hispano-Francesa analysed 
the documentation arriving in both zones of the protectorate in 
order to avoid the circulation of nationalist ideas. 
6 With the subtitle “The pilgrimage from the political point of 
view”, Box 81/665, AFR, AGA. Legajo: Peregrinaciones.
7 Notification addressed by the Oficina Central de Intervención in 
Tétouan to the Council of Ministers-General Directorate of Mo-
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rocco, May 12th 1930. Box 81/665, AFR, AGA. Legajo: Pere-
grinaciones.
 8 Communication sent by the Oficina Central de Intervención in 
Tétouan to the Council of Ministers-General Directorate of Mo-
rocco, July 10th 1930. Box 81/665, AFR, AGA. Legajo: Pere-
grinaciones.
 9 Notification sent by Tomás García Figueras to Colonel Fernan-
do Capaz, September 25th 1930. Box 81/665, AFR, AGA. Le-
gajo: Peregrinaciones.
10 Notification sent by Tomás García Figueras to Colonel Fernan-
do Capaz, February 5th 1931. Box 81/665, AFR, AGA. Legajo: 
Peregrinaciones
11 Notification addressed to General Jordana by Tomas García 
Figueras, with the subject “Pilgrimage to Mecca”. February 5, 
1931. Box 81/665, AFR, AGA. Legajo: Peregrinaciones
12 The application of the decree of June 3rd 1931 in which the Re-
publican government reorganized the military presence in Mo-
rocco, reducing the number of officers, led many officers to re-
turn to Spain, and García Figueras’s resignation from the 
military.
13 Maria Rosa De Madariaga (2015, pp. 345-364) analyzes Beig-
beder’s role in promoting the idea of the “sentimental protector-
ate”, which would have its most significant expression in the 
sponsorship of the pilgrimage to Mecca. Beigbeder represents 
the profile of the military man who turned his “morophobia” 
into “morophilia” (Velasco de Castro, 2014), adapting to the 
new political circumstances derived from the civil war  in order 
to win the support of Moroccan society for the military revolt 
against the Spanish Republic.
14 In his work, García Figueras seems to have got over the rejec-
tion of his initial proposal for sponsoring the pilgrimage: “with-
out hesitation or doubt: the first expedition of pilgrims to Mecca 
was, simply, perfect” (García Figueras, 1939, p. 293).
15 Ahmad al-Rahuni, Al-Rihla al-makkiya. Tétouan: Instituto 
General Franco para la Investigación Hispanoárabe, 1941. A 
copy of this work is in the Library of Catalonia and includes an 
interesting photo album with 22 pictures.
16 See Box 81/2428, AFR, AGA. Legajo: Peregrinaciones a La 
Meca.
17 I am grateful to Professor Eloy Martín Corrales (Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra) for revealing this author’s true identity.
18 See Box 81/2431, AFR, AGA. Legajo: Peregrinaciones a La 
Meca.
19 Significant milestones were the signing of the Concordat with 
the Vatican (August 27th 1953), the Pact of Madrid (also in 
1953), which launched Spain-United States relations, and Spain 
joining the UN in 1955. 
20 See Box 81/2432, AFR, AGA. Legajo: Peregrinaciones a La 
Meca. A copy of the Informe General del Peregrinaje de 1953 
can be found in in the Africa section of the Spanish National 
Library, along with an extensive photo album.
21 “Peregrinos musulmanes”, NO-DO, newsreel no. 503-B, Au-
gust 25th, 1952 (http://www.rtve.es/filmoteca/no-do/not-
503/1469613/). “Peregrinación de españoles a La Meca. Musul-
manes de Ifni y Sahara invitados por el gobierno”, NO-DO, 
newsreel no. 1211-A, March 21st 1966 (http://www.rtve.es/fil-
moteca/no-do/not-1211/1477150/).
22 “Sultan Mohamed V chaired a working session with several 
Cabinet ministers, including Foreign Minister Ahmed Bala-
frech, in which he discussed the trip to be made soon by the 
transatlantic liner “Cabo de Hornos” with Moroccan pilgrims to 
Mecca” (La Vanguardia, May 22, 1957).
23 For a historical perspective on the colonization of Western Sa-
hara, see Diego Aguirre (1988).
24 The United Nations report is expressed in these terms: “There is 
religious freedom. Mosques have been built at the expenses of 
the Spanish State, which also pays the salaries of the fakis and 
professors of the Koran. Each year, the Administration sponsors 
the Saharan Moslems’ pilgrimage to Mecca”. Report of the Spe-
cial Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementa-
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Co-
lonial Countries and Peoples (Document A/6300/REV.1. 
United Nations. General Assembly-Twenty-first Session-An-
nexes), p. 601.
25 Boletín Oficial del Estado (State official newsletter): August 6th 
1966; November 20, 1967; December 8th 1971; January 31th 
1973.
26 “Franco recibe a los peregrinos musulmanes a La Meca” NO-
DO, newsreel no. 1216-C, April 25th 1966 (http://www.rtve.es/
filmoteca/no-do/not-1216/1474217/).
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